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Recent trade models determine the equilibrium distribution of firm-level efficiency endogenously
and show that freer trade shifts the distribution towards higher average productivity due to entry and
exit of firms. These models ignore the possibility that freer trade also alters the firm-size distribution
via international firm migration (offshoring); firms must, by assumption, produce in their ’birth nation.’
We show that when firms are allowed to switch locations, new productivity effects arise. Freer trade
induces the most efficient small-nation firms to move to the large nation. The big country gets an ‘extra
helping’ of the most efficient firms while the small nation’s firm-size distribution is truncated on both
ends. This reinforces the big-nation productivity gain while reducing or even reversing the small-nation
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Recent years have seen a flourishing of heterogeneous-firms trade models such as Eaton and 
Kortum (2002) and Melitz (2003). The key innovation in this literature is that it endogenises the 
equilibrium distribution of firm-level efficiency and thereby the equilibrium firm-size distribution 
in an open economy. One result that has attracted much attention is the way in which freer trade 
boost productivity via changes in the equilibrium distribution of firm-level outputs as some the least 
efficient shut down and the most efficient expand.  
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) allow for multinational production, i.e. production by a single 
firm in both home and foreign whose purpose is to avoid trade costs, but the literature to date 
ignores the issue of international firm migration – what is known as offshoring in North America, 
‘delocation’ in Europe and ‘hollowing out’ in Japan – i.e. where a firm ceases production in one 
nation and sets up production abroad. Since firm migration – the shifting of production location by 
individual firms – is an important empirical phenomenon, it is striking that heterogeneous-firms 
trade (HFT) models ignores this spatial relocation.
1 
Our paper argues that the assumption of no spatial relocation in the HFT models is not innocent. We 
work in a framework where nations differ only in size.
2 In this world, freer trade has two distinct 
effects. The first is the well-known pro-productivity effect discussed above. The second is that it 
creates “home market effect” pressures that foster the shifting of production to the larger market. In 
the standard HFT model, all the home-market-effect pressure is alleviate via the entry and exit of 
firms (see, for example, the asymmetric case in Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple 2004). We argue that 
since entry/exit is not instantaneous, some of the home-market-effect pressure would be alleviated 
via relocation of the most efficient firms from the small market to the large market – as long as the 
possibility of spatial reallocation is not ruled out by assumption. Such firm-migration would have 
interesting implications for the firm-size distribution in both nations. The big country would get an 
‘extra helping’ of the most efficient firms and the small nation’s firm-size distribution would be 
truncated on both ends. The most efficient firms would relocate and the least efficient firms would 
exit.  
In this way, relocation adds a new dimension to the productivity impact of freer trade. The big 
nation gets an extra large productivity gain while the small nation’s productivity gain is mitigated or 
even reversed.  
To demonstrate these interactions as cleanly as possible, our paper combines a simple New 
Economic Geography (NEG) model – namely, the Footloose Capital model of Martin and Rogers 
(1995) – with a simple heterogeneous-firms trade model. Since NEG and HFT models are both on 
the edge of analytic tractability, it is not surprising that the combined model is impossible to solve 
analytically when we allow entry/exit and relocation simultaneously. To explore the combined 
model analytically, we consider two polar cases: One where entry and exit of firms is instantaneous, 
but relocation is slow, and one where relocation is instantaneous, but entry/exit is slow.  
1.1.  Literature review 
Our paper has antecedents from two strands of literature, the heterogeneous firms trade literature 
and the ‘new economic geography’ literature. We address these in turn.  
                                                 
1 Many empirical studies found the offshoring of production using micro-data, such as Head and Ries (2003) and 
Tomiura (2007).  
2 Thus we are thinking of relocation from, e.g. Canada to the US, or Sweden to Germany rather than the US to China. International Trade, Offshoring and Heterogeneous Firms, Baldwin & Okubo  2
One recent branch of trade theory has focused on differences among firms. This literature is 
reviewed recently by Redding (2010) with the main theoretical papers being Eaton and Kortum 
(2002), Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003), Melitz (2003), Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple 
(2004), Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007), Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), Yeaple (2005), 
Demidova (2005) and Chaney (2005). For brevity’s sake, we refer to these as the heterogeneous-
firms trade (HFT) models. 
The HFT models were motivated by empirical evidence. For example, firm differences within 
sectors may be more pronounced than differences between sector averages, and most firms – even 
in traded-goods sectors – do not export at all (Bernard and Jensen 1995, 1999a,b, 2001; Clerides, 
Lach and Tybout 1998, Aw, Chung, and Roberts 2000, Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz 2004; see 
Tybout 2003 for a survey).  
The other strand of literature that is relevant to our work is the so-called New Economic Geography 
literature, of which Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) and Fujita and Thisse (2002) are the 
standard references. In this literature, increasing returns to scale and trade costs create forces that 
foster spatial agglomeration. Since the well-known core-periphery model was introduced by 
Krugman (1991), various models have been provided by the literature. The simplest of these models 
is the so-called Footloose Capital (FC) model proposed by Martin and Rogers (1995). The FC 
model features two, potentially asymmetric regions with only capital being inter-regionally mobile. 
Each firm is identified with one unit of capital; all capital is owned by labourers who are inter-
regionally immobile, so all capital earnings are repatriated. As a consequence, the FC model has no 
demand linkages, i.e. the shift of firms between regions does not change the size of market 
demands.   
The paper that is closest to ours in combining heterogeneous firms and NEG considerations is our 
earlier paper, Baldwin and Okubo (2006b). That paper ignores two key elements that are crucial to 
the heterogeneous-firms literature, namely entry and exit of firms, and fixed market entry costs. The 
main findings in that paper are that the most efficient firms are likely to first relocate to the bigger 
market. This suggests that standard econometric tests of agglomeration economies are biased. 
Okubo (2009) and Okubo et al. (2010) are other papers in this line.
3   
Plan of paper 
The rest of the paper is organised into four sections. The next section introduces the model and 
solves it for the closed economy case. The following two sections works out the trading equilibrium 
and the welfare impact on the small nation. The final section presents our concluding remarks.  
2. THE MODEL 
The model works with two nations and two sectors. The nations – the North and the South – have 
identical tastes, technology, and openness to trade, but they differ in terms of size (North is larger 
by convention). The two sectors are M (manufactures) and a numeraire sector. The numeraire sector 
produces a homogenous good subject to constant returns, perfect competition and costless trade. 
The M-sector produces a continuum of varieties under conditions of increasing returns and Dixit-
Stiglitz monopolistic competition.  
Tastes of each consumer in either nation are given by a logarithmic quasi-linear utility function: 
                                                 
3 Okubo (2009) studies the vertical linkage of input-output with heterogeneous firms in economic geography model. 
Okubo et al. (2010) employs the monopolistic competition model with linear demand and finds spatial sorting and co-
agglomeration.  International Trade, Offshoring and Heterogeneous Firms, Baldwin & Okubo  3
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where CM and CA are, respectively, consumption of the composite of M-sector varieties and the 
numeraire,  is the constant elasticity of substitution between any two M-sector varieties and  
measures demand for manufactures. The integral is over the set of varieties available for 
consumption in a particular nation. All varieties are symmetric on the demand side.  
Our M-sector firms face constant marginal production costs and a fixed start-up cost. We assume 
that the marginal cost involves only labour while the start-up cost involves only capital (the amount 
of start-up capital is normalised to one unit per variety). Capital is a “produced factor” rather than a 
primary factor. Creating a firm in the M-sector requires the creation of one unit of capital; this 
process involves only labour. We also deviate from the standard Dixit-Stiglitz model by assuming 
that firms are heterogeneous in terms of their manufacturing efficiency (marginal cost). Following 
Melitz (2003), we work with a simplified version of the Hopenhayn (1992a, 1992b) mechanism of 
firm development whereby each M-sector firm is associated with a particular labour input 
coefficient – denoted as aj for firm j. Since each firm is associated with a unique unit of capital, it is 
natural to view the firms’ heterogeneity in marginal cost as a feature associated with its unit capital. 
Capital can be viewed either as physical capital or knowledge capital (i.e. some form of firm-
specific knowledge).  
Since there is one unit of capital per firm, international migration by firms (i.e. relocation) is 
synonymous with capital mobility in our model. As mentioned, all capital is owned by labourers 
who are immobile between nations and capital income is repatriated costlessly, so capital/firms 
move in search of the highest reward irrespective of national cost-of-living considerations.  
The marginal costs, the ‘a’s, are determined during the capital creation process. A potential firm 
pays a start-up cost of FI units of labour to create a unit of capital. Just after sinking this cost, the 
capital is randomly assigned an ‘a’ from a distribution function, G[a], which has positive 
probability for a[0,a0]. It may be useful to think of this as a stochastic production function in the 
capital-creation process. Following Melitz (2003), we ignore intertemporal discounting but keep the 
present values finite by assuming that capital depreciates in a particular way. Firms face a constant 
probability of ‘death’ according to a Poisson process with the hazard rate . 
M-sector firms face per-unit and per-market ‘selling’ costs on top of their production costs. The per-
unit costs are standard – they are zero in the local market but involve ‘iceberg’ trade costs in the 
export market such that a firm must ship 1+t  1 units to sell one unit in the export market. The per-
market costs – what we call ‘beachhead costs’ – reflect the fixed cost of establishing a foothold for 
each new variety in each market. We think of this as reflecting the cost of meeting market-specific 
standards and regulations, and locally establishing a brand name. The beachhead cost per market is 
denoted as F; it involves only labour inputs.
4  
2.1.  Intermediate results 
Results for the numeraire sector in this sort of model are well known. Constant returns, perfect 
competition and zero trade costs in the numeraire sector equalise nominal wage rates across nations. 
We choose units of the numeraire good such that the equalised wage rate is unity. This means that 
all differences in M-firms’ marginal costs are due to differences in their a’s so we can refer to the 
a’s as marginal cost without ambiguity. 
                                                 
4 Many HFT models allow separate beachhead costs for the local (FD) and export market (FX), but this plays no role in 
our model so we assume that are identical to reduce notational clutter in the expressions (FD=Fx=F). International Trade, Offshoring and Heterogeneous Firms, Baldwin & Okubo  4
The M-sector is marked by all the well known Dixit-Stiglitz results. Firms’ prices are a constant 
mark-up of their marginal selling costs. In the local market, these marginal costs entail only 
production costs. The price in the export market, by contrast, will include the iceberg costs, t  1, 
marked up by the constant Dixit-Stiglitz mark-up. Given the logarithmic quasi-linear preferences, 
expenditure on manufactured goods is invariant to trade costs and firm location (assuming only that 
the region’s endowments are such that some of both goods are produced in both nations). These 
results allow us to normalise worldwide expenditure on manufactured goods to unity without loss of 
generality. Specifically, we choose units of labour such that L
w=1/, so world expenditure on M 
goods, namely E
w, is unity. 
The standard CES demand function for variety-j produced and sold in the North can be written as  
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where pj is variety-j’s producer price (which equals its consumer price since it is produced locally), 
and  p is the usual CES price index in the North. The first term in the definition of  p reflects the 
prices of goods that are produced in the North (and so bear no iceberg trade costs). The second term 
reflects the imported varieties whose producer prices are ph;  and * are sets of consumed goods 
that are produced in the North and the South, respectively. A parameter that plays a critical role in 
our paper is ; we refer to it as the ‘free-ness’ (phi-ness) of trade, and note that  ranges from zero 
when trade is perfectly un-free (t = ) to unity when trade is perfectly free (t = 0). Southern demand 
functions are isomorphic. 
2.1.1 Solution  difficulties 
The model is marked by a complex matrix of interactions involving firm heterogeneity, export 
behaviour, free entry-exit and international relocation. The spatial allocation of firms poses the 
greatest difficulties. The location choice depends upon the degree of competition in each market but 
this depends in turn upon the mass and efficiency of the firms that choose to locate and enter in 
each market. The crux of the difficulty lies in defining  p  and  p * when the production location of 
varieties is not determined a priori. To determine the equilibrium location of firms, we need to 
know the degree of competition in each market, but this in turn depends upon the distribution of the 
marginal costs in each market. In general, a firm with any marginal cost could locate in either 
nation, so it is not obvious how one would apply the density function for the a’s in forming the 
integrals behind the p ’s.  
The literature has leaned on two extreme assumptions to get past this difficulty. The traditional 
NEG literature ignores firm heterogeneity so the spatial distribution of firms boils down to the 
number of identical firms producing in each market (i.e. G is degenerated so the integrals in  p  and 
p * are trivial). The standard HFT model rules out relocation by fiat so the distribution of active 
firms in each nation is simple – firms must, by assumption, produce in the nation they are ‘born’ so 
the distribution of active firms in a nation is a simple transformation of the underlying G[a]. 
Determining the equilibrium when firms are heterogeneous and internationally mobile is the central 
technical difficulty of our model. We start on this problem by working through the closed-economy 
case. 
2.2.  Equilibrium under autarky 
We start with autarky, defined here as zero mobility of goods (i.e.  = 0) and firms since, as in 
Melitz (2003), firms are assumed by fiat to produce where they are born. The first task is to work 
out the steady state distribution of active firms.  International Trade, Offshoring and Heterogeneous Firms, Baldwin & Okubo  5
Firms are active if being so is profitable. Given (2), the Poisson death process and well-known 
Dixit-Stiglitz mark-up, the steady-state present value of being an active firm with a marginal cost of 
aj is: 
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Since this present value increases as a firm’s marginal cost falls, it is easy to see that only varieties 
with sufficiently low a’s will find it worth their while to sink the ‘beachhead cost’ F. Defining this 
threshold marginal cost as aD, the cut-off condition is: 
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where m  reflects the marginal costs of active firms, ‘n’ is the mass of firms, and  ] [ D a a G is the 
conditional distribution function of ‘a’ (conditional on a  aD); here we have cancelled out the 
mark-ups and defined ‘f’ and ‘B’ for notational convenience; B is the per firm demand.  
Note that we have switched from integrating over varieties to integrating over a’s. As Melitz (2003) 
shows, the distribution of a’s comes from the features of the firm birth and death processes. In 
steady state, a continuous flow of new varieties is generated to replace the continual flow of ‘dying’ 
varieties. Given the variety-generation process assumed, the a’s of new varieties are distributed 
according to nG[a], 0  a  1, where ‘n’ is the mass of firms. In other words the distribution of 
new varieties is a simple transformation of the underlying G. In particular, the beachhead cost 
implies that not all new varieties are produced, so the distribution of varieties that are actually 
produced is a truncated version of nG[a], namely  ] [ D a a nG  , where  ] [ D a a G  is the distribution 
function conditional on ‘a’ being less than aD. 
The cut-off condition defines the optimal sales strategy for a firm with a given ‘a’ (they sell only if 
the marginal cost is below aD), thus the equilibrium present value of operating profits for a variety 
with aj is: 
    ; ; 0
1 a a for zero a a for
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In the first stage – the innovation stage where FI is sunk – potential firms form expectations as to 
their likely future profits by considering these two present values and the likelihood that they will 
draw an ‘a’ below aD. Specifically, the integral of these present values over all possible a’s, 
weighted by the probability of each ‘a’ (i.e. the unconditional density function) provides the 
expected benefit of sinking FI. Free entry ensures that the mass of firms ‘n’ rises to the point where 
the expected benefit of innovation is driven to zero and this gives us the free-entry condition: 
(4)     I I I
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These two conditions, namely the cut-off condition (3) and the free entry condition (4), characterise 
the two equilibrating variables aD and n.  
To get an analytic solution, we assume G is a Pareto distribution: 
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where the parameters  and a0 are Pareto’s shape and scale parameters; without loss of generality, 
we choose units such that the maximum marginal cost a0 equals 1. Using this, we solve (4) and (3) 
to get: 































Here we introduce the collection of parameters, , for convenience and note that  > 1 is a 
regularity condition, assumed throughout the paper (it ensures the integrals converge). The South’s 
equilibrium conditions are isomorphic.
5  
3. EQUILIBRIUM WITH TRADE 
Starting from the closed-economy steady state, consider the impact of lowering the iceberg trade 
cost. As trade opens up, pressures for the well-known home market effect (HME) appear. That is, 
there is a tendency for deeper integration to make the large market more attractive to firms in the 
increasing-returns sector while simultaneously making the small market less attractive. There are 
two ways for the equilibrium to adjust to the HME pressure: (1) Firms can physically migrate, 
moving their unit of capital from the small South to the big North; or (2) Firm births can exceed 
firm deaths in the North, while the opposite occurs in the South.  
 
 
Figure 1: NEG and HFT solution to calculation difficulties. 
 
The fact that relocation and/or entry/exit can occur makes characterisation of the equilibrium 
difficult. We know that the distribution of firm-births and firm-deaths in equilibrium must be 
] [a nG   and  ] [ * a G n  , but we do not know, a priori, where these varieties will be manufactured. 
The crux of the difficulty is that determining production location requires knowledge of the degree 
                                                 
5 Given the logarithmic quasi-linear preferences, E and E* can be taken as parameters since they equal L and L*, 
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of local competition, namely the m ’s, but defining these requires knowledge of where each variety 
is manufactured.
6  
To tackle this problem, it is useful to work out the equilibrium assuming that entry/exit and 
relocation occur in sequence, as illustrated by Figure 1.  
First we assume entry/exit is instantaneous, and then we allow relocation (we move from the origin 
in the figure to the second circle by going over and then up); this is the approach implicit in the 
standard HFT literature, e.g. Melitz (2003). Second, we assume relocation is instantaneous and then 
allow free entry/exit (we move from the origin in the figure to the second circle by going up and 
then over); roughly speaking, this is what is assumed in NEG models.  
We consider these alternative adjustment paths in isolation before considering the general case. 
3.1.  Instantaneous entry/exit followed by relocation 
As we shall see, when entry/exit is instantaneous but relocation is slow, all adjustment to the HME 
pressure occurs via entry/exit. The solution therefore is very similar to that of the well-known 
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) equilibrium. The cut-off conditions for local and export sales 
are:
7 
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where the two beachhead costs are assumed to be identical for simplicity’s sake, and m and m * 
(weighted average marginal selling costs in the Northern and Southern markets) are: 
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Here n and n* are the masses of firms producing in the North and the South.
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Since we have normalised the size of the world economy such that world expenditure on M-
varieties is unity (i.e. (L+L*) equals 1), the four equilibrium conditions in (7) and (8) can be 
solved analytically to yield: 
                                                 
6 To highlight two contrasting cases, i.e. relocation versus entry/exit, we study instantaneous relocation and entry/exit in 
the static model. Chaney (2005) models the dynamics and finds overshooting of productivity when a country opens 
trade. Since his model is dynamic, the model successfully depicts asymmetric speed of entry and exit. Firms that had 
entered but found production unprofitable in autarchy would start production. The slow exit of firms could make more 
severe competition when trade opens but in the long-run it will be mitigated as firms eventually die.  
7 In principle, there are four cut-off conditions defining the threshold marginal costs for D-type and X-type firms in the 
North and the South, but as is well-known from the HFT literature, free entry implies that the thresholds are identical 
despite size difference between the two nations; see Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004).. 
8 The first integral in the expression for m  captures the marginal costs of locally produced goods, i.e. goods that have 
marginal costs between zero and aD. The term dG[a aD] reflects the mass of firms with marginal cost ‘a’ conditional on 
the fact that the firm is producing at all, i.e. that its ‘a’ is less than aD. The limits of the second integral are from zero to 
aX which is the cut-off marginal cost for Southern firms exporting to the North. The expression for m * is isomorphic, 
but  applies to sales in the Northern market. Recall that the geometric weights are negative, so m and m * fall as 























































































Here we introduce the standard NEG ‘share notation’ where sn and sE are the North’s share of the 
worldwide mass of firms n+n* and worldwide expenditure on all M-sector varieties E+E* (sE is 
exogenous in our model and sn, which characterises the spatial allocation of industry, is one of the 
key endogenous variables).  
Note that an implication of the equilibrium conditions is that B=B*, i.e. the per-firm demand is 
equalised despite the market size differences. Intuitively, this result is quite obvious. Free entry 
means that the number of competitors in each market rises to the point where further entry is 
uneconomic. In other words, the number of firms per market must adjust to the point where each 
market is equally attractive to firms, in particular to the point where potential firms are just 
indifferent to sinking FI.  
The HME is clear from the fourth expression in (9), the expression of the equilibrium sn. By 
inspection, we see that as trade gets freer (d>0), the share of firms in the North rises above the 
North’s relative size (i.e. sn>sE). Compared with the homogeneous firms model, where the HME 
derivative is dsn/dsE equals (1+)/(1-),
9 the HME derivation in our model is smaller, namely 
(1+
)/(1-
), because of  > 1. This implies that firm heterogeneity dampens agglomeration in 
terms of firm shares. 
3.1.1 Allowing  relocation 
When firms are allowed to change locations (i.e. relocate), each existing firm compares the 
operating profit it would earn in the two markets. For X-type firms, which are already selling in 
both markets, the question boils down to the minimization of trade costs. Its operating profit when 
located in the North is a
1-(B+B*)/; when located in the South it is a
1-(B+B*)/. Since B=B* in 
equilibrium (as explained above), these are identical so all X-types are indifferent to relocation. 
Likewise, no D-type could gain by relocating. Indeed, since relocation would involve re-sinking F, 
no D-type would move. Likewise, every newly born firm is completely indifferent to its location. 
To summarise: 
Result 1: Instantaneous entry/exit relieves all pressure to relocate, i.e. instantaneous entry/exit 
is a perfect substitute for relocation, so the instant-entry-then-relocation case is identical to 
the standard HFT model.  
In the next section, Section 3.2, we consider the diametrically opposed case, where we move from 
autarky to trade assuming that relocation is instantaneous and then free entry occurs. However first 
we characterise the trade and productivity effects of freer trade. These results are familiar from the 
standard HFT literature, but we quickly review them to fix ideas and introduce notation and 
analytical techniques that are useful for the instant-relocation-then-entry case in Section 3.2. 
3.1.2  Trade, production and productivity effects 
The effects of greater openness are well known. The rise in aX means more firms in both nations 
export, so exports rise and this, in turn, heightens competition in both markets, so the sales of D-
                                                 
9 See Martin and Rogers (1995) for instance.  International Trade, Offshoring and Heterogeneous Firms, Baldwin & Okubo  9
type firms fall in both markets; this is the well-known share-shifting effect. Additionally, the 
marginal D-types (those with a’s near aD) are driven out; this is the well-known selection effect. 
Both the selection and the share-shifting effects raise average productivity in both nations. Due to 
the HME, n rises and n* falls; this increases the degree of inter-industry trade as resources are 
shifted out of the M-sector in the small nation and into the numeraire sector.  
Formally, productivity can be measured by the firm-level productivity weighted by firm’s 
production share. For the North, this productivity measure is:  
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where a  is referred to as the weighted average unit input coefficient; this is a measure of average 
productivity since the geometric weights are negative, but a drop in the input-coefficient enhances 
productivity. North’s total production, TP is given by: 
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Note that the ratios in large parentheses are the production shares of firms. The first integral shows 
the a’s for X-type firms, while the second integration shows the a’s for D-type firms. A drop in the 
average ‘a’ is an improvement in average productivity.  
As we shall see below, the productivity effects are substantially more complex when relocation 
occurs. To set the stage for the more complex analysis, we replicate Melitz’s well-known pro-
productivity results using a flexible analytic technique. The basic idea is to view a  as the weighted 
average of the invariant underlying distribution G[a] and see how freer trade shifts the weights.  
Using (5) to solve the TP integrals and the equilibrium expression for aD in (9), we can re-write (10) 
as:
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Plainly, WX rises and WD falls as trade gets freer (d>0).
11  
Using the standard formula for the derivative of a definite integral: 
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When da /d is written in this way, we see that the productivity impact of freer trade depends upon 
the impact of d on the ‘weighting’ terms – the dW/d’s – under the integrals – and the impact on 
the limits of integration – i.e. the last two terms. We know that the derivative (11) is negative (i.e. 
there is a pro-productivity effect) since freer trade uniformly shifts weight from high values of a
1-+ 
to low values.  
                                                 
10 See Baldwin and Okubo (2006a) for details.  
11 Note d ln{WX}/d is (1-
-1)/{(1+)(1+
)}; this is positive since >1 (regularity condition). International Trade, Offshoring and Heterogeneous Firms, Baldwin & Okubo  10
Figure 2 shows this graphically. The term that is being weighted, namely G[a]a
1-+, is shown with 
the rising solid line and we note that it is invariant to the freeness of trade. The weighting function 
before the increase in trade freeness is shown with the solid horizontal line, “Weights (pre)”. After 
the opening, the weighting function shifts to “Weights (post)”, so the weight on a’s below aX rises 
and the weight on a’s above aX falls. The impact of the change in the limits of integration is fourfold 
and corresponds to the third and fourth terms in (11). The first and second terms in (11) represent 
the switch of the weighting lines holding aD and aX at the initial level. The third term shows the 
impact of shift in weight for the range of a’s between the pre and post export cut-off. The final term 
shows the shift in weight (from positive to zero) for the range of a’s between the pre and post D-
type cut-off.  
Plainly the post-integration weighting curve unambiguously shifts mass to lower values of a, so we 
know that a  falls, i.e. manufacturing productivity rises since the average unit labour input 
coefficient falls. In a sense, freer trade “pivots” the density clockwise around aX’, lowering the 
weight on a’s above aX’ and raising it on a’s below aX’. Freer trade is pro-productivity in the South 
for the same reasons.  
Figure 2: Trade liberalisation’s productivity impact HFT model, free entry case. 
 
3.2.  Instantaneous relocation followed by entry/exit  
The assumption of instantaneous birth-and-death of firms is clearly unrealistic. If entry/exit takes 
time, some firms may adjust to the HME pressure by moving to the big market. In other words, 
some of the HME adjustment may occur via relocation of firms from the small market to the large 
market (as in the New Economic Geography literature) rather than via entry/exit as in the HFT 
literature. 
To explore this possibility, this section considers the other polar assumption that relocation is 
instantaneous and then considers possibility of entry/exit. As before we start from the autarky 
equilibrium. With entry/exit ruled out by fiat initially, the two free entry conditions and the 
domestic cut-off condition are suspended, so all firms that were active in autarky remain active 
initially when trade and firm-migration become possible.  
The initial distribution of active firms under autarky are characterised in Section 2.2. Using (6) 
North (big)
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When we allow relocation, the first question to ask is: “Which firms move first?” To answer this, 
we calculate the incipient gains that atomistic firms would anticipate when no relocation has yet 
occurred.
12 The present-value gain from relocation for X-type firms would be: 
(13)     X X a a B B
a
a v      







Note that the magnitude of this change is highest for firms with the lowest marginal cost and it is 
always positive since B > B* in the initial situation.
13 For Southern D-type firms migrating to the 
North, the gain would be: 
(14)     D X D a a a B B
a
a v     






Figure 3 graphs (13) and (14) and shows that the firms that have the most to gain are the most 
efficient firms, thus it is the most efficient firms that will tend to move first.
14 This result is 
intuitively obvious, since the HME is driven by firm’s desire to minimise trade costs by locating 
near the big market; large/efficient firms sell more and thus have more to gain from moving to the 
big market. Note that by the definition of aX, firms with a = aX are just indifferent to exporting so 
vX[a] and vD[a] touch at aX as shown in Figure 3.  
Result 2: The most efficient export firms in the small nation move to the large nation first. 
The local small firms have less incentive to move to the large nation.  
 
Figure 3: Relocation gains in initial, no-relocation situation. 
 
                                                 
12 Our paper follows the relocation process of Baldwin and Okubo (2006b). See Appendix for more details and formal 
characterisation. The locational equilibrium line is assumed to be a sequential equilibrium rather than a Nash 
equilibrium. In the sequential equilibrium, firms move in order of productivity. 
13 See our first version, Baldwin and Okubo (2006a), for calculations. 
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The order of relocation 
Since the most efficient firms have the most to gain from moving, the most efficient Southern firms 
move first. The relocation itself, however, raises the degree of competition in big North market and 
lowers it in the South, so the value to any given firms of moving declines as the range of firms that 
have moved expands. The process continues until the gain from moving is zero, i.e. the location 
condition, B = B*, holds (i.e. firms move until all firms are indifferent to location which happens 
when B = B*). 
Formally, taking the range of Southern firms that have moved to the North as a[0,aR], where ‘R’ is 
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The key change here is that now Southern varieties with a’s between zero and aR are produced in 
the North and so are not subject to trade costs in the Northern market. Solving these and using the 
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Solving the location condition, B = B*, yields the ‘relocation threshold’ aR as a function of the 
export threshold aX: 
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where aD and n
w are pinned down by the initial conditions (no entry/exit yet). The second 
expression cannot be solved analytically for aX since  and 1- are different non-integer powers, 
but the expression has a unique and positive solution since the left-hand side is monotonically 
falling as aX rises and it starts at infinity when aX = 0.  
Two phases of migration, XX and DD 
Inspection of (17) reveals that aR starts out at zero but gets progressively closer to aX as the level of 
trade freeness (i.e. ) rises. This implies that the migrating firms are initially X-types as discussed 
above. When trade is sufficiently free, aR equals aX. At this level of trade freeness, all Southern X-
types will have moved to the North. Beyond this level of trade freeness, a second phase of 
relocation begins where all the migrating firms are D-types. We refer to these two phases of 
migration as XX and DD migration. The exact level of  where DD migration begins is simple to 
calculate. Setting aR = aX and solving for  yields: International Trade, Offshoring and Heterogeneous Firms, Baldwin & Okubo  13









p is the ‘partitioning’ level of trade freeness.  
When  falls below 
p, migration affects the B’s differently because the South no longer exports 
manufactures to the North and the migrating firms no longer sell back into the Southern market. 
The m ’s are now:
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Using (19) to define the B’s and sn = sE, and solving the relocation condition for aR yields: 
















a a  
The export cut-off condition for sales from the North to the South is the same as in the XX 
migration case given. From (9), we see that as before, aR continues to rise gradually as trade gets 
freer.  
Using the ratio of the cut-off conditions (20) can be written in terms of aD. Solving for the  where 
aR=aD tells us the level of openness at which all firms have left the small nation – what is known as 
the ‘sustain point’ in economic geography, 
S. It is: 

















Note that since  > 1, and sE >½  the 
P < 
s < 1. This means that as trade freeness, , limits to 1, it 
eventually passes the sustain point 
s and so full agglomeration occurs. However, as  increases, 
full agglomeration is less likely. At extreme, when  = , full agglomeration never happens except 
for costless trade in which case any spatial location of production is an equilibrium, including full 
agglomeration. For  to approach infinity,  must approach infinity (this means that the firm 
marginal cost distribution is heavily skewed to the left, i.e. towards the highest marginal cost), or  
must approach unity.  
To summarise: 
Result 3: (Two phases of firm relocation). The gradual reduction of iceberg trade costs 
produces a gradual relocation of firms from the small nation to the big nation as in NEG 
models, but firms the most efficient firms leave first. This process is marked by two phases: 
migration of small-nation X-types (who remain X-types after their relocation), and – once all 
X-type firms have left the small nation – migration of small-nation D-type firms (who remain 
D-types in their new location). The ‘partitioning’ threshold between the two phases of 
migration is defined by the level of trade freeness, 
P, which equals (1-sE)/sE; all firms are in 
the big region when trade freeness  surpasses the sustain point ((1-sE)/sE)
1/
. 
Result 4: The sustain point rises (implying less agglomeration for any given level of trade 
freeness), as Pareto distribution of firm marginal costs is skewed rightward. At the extreme of International Trade, Offshoring and Heterogeneous Firms, Baldwin & Okubo  14
an infinity skewed distribution ( = ), full agglomeration cannot occur. 
The spatial distribution of firms according to their level of efficiency is depicted schematically in  
Figure 4. Note that the big Northern market has an extra allocation of the most efficient firms while 
the Southern market has none. The diagram shows the situation for a level of trade freeness, , 
where the relocation is still in the XX phase. 
 
 Figure 4: Geographic distribution of firms with free relocation. 
3.2.1 Allowing  entry/exit 
In parallel with the previous section, we turn now to consider entry/exit. That is, we now add back 
the two free entry conditions and the domestic cut-off condition. To be concrete, we assume that  
is such that marginal migration is of the XX type, i.e. 0 <  < 
P, although the analysis would be 
qualitatively identical for  > 
P. As always, the B’s are critical. Using (16) to eliminate aR and the 
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Solving this for n
w: 
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Since sn = sE in the case at hand, the comparison of (21) and (12) makes it clear that allowing entry 
and exit after instantaneous relocation results in a reduction in the number of active firms. In other 
words, relocation does not fully relieve the HME pressure; global mass of firms must rise to restore 
expected pure profits to zero. This of course, requires the firm-birth rate to exceed the firm-death 
rate. Since the location condition assures the equality of profitability in the two nations, we assume 
that this affects each potential innovator in the world in the same way. This is natural to assume that 
the overall reduction in n
w will rise pro rata on Northern and Southern varieties, so the share of 
firms owned by Northern citizens, sn, will not change. In short, we assume that sn = sE even after the 
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Using (21) to solve this for aD and using the ratio of cut-off conditions to get aX, we have: 
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a       
(21), (22) and (16) characterise the equilibrium. Comparing (22) to (12), we see that the impact of 
trade and relocation involves the standard HFT model effects of lowering the threshold for D-type 
firms where sn = sE.  
3.2.2  Trade, production and productivity effects 
The effects of integration are much richer in the instantaneous-relocation-then-entry case. As in the 
instantaneous entry case in section 3.1, we get share-shifting and selection effects via the change in 
aD. However, we get a new effect from relocation, namely the change in aR. This means that freer 
trade has an extra large productivity effect on the big nation since the firms that migrate to the big 
nation in response to freer trade are systematically more efficient than the least efficient of the 
existing firms. Correspondingly, the small nation experiences less of a pro-productivity effect. 
Indeed as we shall see, the small nation’s productivity may actually fall as trade gets freer.  
 
Figure 5: Productivity effects, free relocation case. 
                                                 
15 While (8) is the standard way of writing the free-entry condition, it is conceptually much simpler to work with a 
global free entry condition and B=B*. That is, instead of using the pair of free-entry conditions, we can use a single, 
global entry condition and B=B* to determine n
w and sn. The global free entry condition starts from the fact that the ex 
ante likelihood of getting a ‘winner’ with any particular ‘a’ is exactly the same as the actual distribution of a’s in the 
market (here ‘winner’ means D or X type). In other words, the ex ante expected operating profit of a winner is the 
average operating profit earned in the market. This average operating profit is E
w/n
w. Each unit of capital developed, 
however, does not lead to a ‘winner.’ The ex ante expected fixed cost of getting a winner (i.e. developing a D- or X-













F F F    . The first right-hand term is the fixed cost for local sales – an expense that 
every winner will incur. The second term reflects the fact that some ‘winners’ will be X-types so their developer will 
find it profitable to incur F as well; G[aX]/G[aD] is the probability of being an X-type conditional on being a winner. 
The third right-hand term reflects the ex ante expected variety development cost, i.e. FI times 1/G[aD] is the number of 























aR aR’ aX aX’International Trade, Offshoring and Heterogeneous Firms, Baldwin & Okubo  16
 
Figure 5, which is akin to Figure 2, shows the impact on the North’s and South’s average 
productivity when the economy is in the XX-phase of firm migration (relocating firms are X-types). 
For the North, freer trade pivots the density around aX’ and so unambiguously shifts weight to lower 
values of a
1-+. The North’s weighted-average ‘a’ thus falls, i.e. average productivity rises. The 
right panel shows the impact on the South. Here, we get the usual share-shifting and selection 
effects, but since the South loses its most efficient firms (the weight on a
1-+ between aR and aR’ 
falls to zero), the overall productivity impact on the sales-weighted ‘a’ is dampened. Indeed if the 
a
1-+ curve is rising steeply enough, the average can actually rise, as we shall see below. 
In the XX-case, our productivity measure is: 
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Solving the integral, we get:  
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In the case of DD-phase relocation (firms that move are D-types), we have explicit solutions and the 
formal expression for the weight average ‘a’ can be written as: 
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Since aD falls with freer trade and aR rises, the productivity effect is ambiguous. In particular, using 
(20), the ratio of cut-offs and (22), we have 
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where s = sn = sE is given by the initial conditions. Note that the first right-hand term is decreasing 
in  and so tends to imply that freer trade is pro-productivity; the second term however is increasing 
in  and thus anti-productivity.
16 We can vary the relative importance to the two conflicting terms 
by varying . When  is small (the regularity condition only requires  to be bigger than 1-), the 
pro-productivity term gets stronger relative to the anti-productivity term, so the overall derivative is 
negative (freer trade lowers the average a). Conversely, when  is large, freer trade tends to be anti-
                                                 
16 Expressing the second term as (1-x
a)/(1-x) which is increasing in x if and only if a>1. International Trade, Offshoring and Heterogeneous Firms, Baldwin & Okubo  17
productivity. Heuristically speaking, when  is high, then the line a
1+- is very steep and this 
amplifies the productivity impact of the loss of probability weight on low values of a’s that occurs 
due to a rise in aR.  




3/2, which is positive since s > ½. In other words, freer trade lowers 
productivity in the small nation in this case.  
To summarise, we write 
Result 5: (New productivity effects). Allowing relocation introduces a new productivity effect; 
since the most efficient firms migrate first and freer trade encourages such relocation, freer 
trade leads to an extra large productivity gain in the large nation which receives the migrating 
firms, but dampens the productivity gains in the small nation. During the second phase of 
migration (see Result 3), freer trade always boosts productivity in the large nation, but may 
raise or lower productivity in the small nation. If  is large enough, freer trade lowers the 
small nation’s productivity.  
3.3.  General model 
Modelling the entry/exit and relocation process more generally than we have with our two polar 
cases runs into the fundamental indeterminacy of the system. We have five equilibrium conditions – 
the two cut-off conditions, the two free-entry conditions and the location condition – and five 
equilibrating variables, aD, aX, n, n* and aR. However, the two free-entry conditions and the location 
condition are not independent; any two imply the third. For example, if the two free-entry 
conditions hold, the location condition B = B* holds automatically. If the location condition and 
one free entry condition hold, the other free entry condition is automatically satisfied. 
This means that we cannot determine sn, n
w and aR in general; the most we can say is that: 
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where the cut-offs are defined as in (22). The standard HFT model resolves the indeterminacy by 
ignoring relocation, i.e. by assuming aR = 0. The standard NEG model resolves it by ignoring firm 
heterogeneity. The relocation-then-entry/exit case fixes sn with initial conditions and is thus able to 
find aR.  
To pin down sn, n
w and aR in general would require us to introduce quadratic adjustment costs for 
both relocation and entry/exit. The result would be a system of six differential equations for the six 
state variables (the three state variables n
w, sn and aR, and their corresponding co-state variables). 
Working with more than two differential equations is difficult and rarely rewarding. In this case, the 
final result would be that some of the Home Market Effect adjustment would occur via relocation 
and some would occur via entry/exit. Thus, sn would be higher than sE in the general model as some 
of the HME pressure would have been relieved via relocation and some via entry/exit.  
4. SMALL NATION WELFARE 
Section 3.2.2 showed that relocation may, under some circumstances, lower the productivity of the 
small nation’s M-sector, while Section 3.1.2 showed that the small-nation productivity always rose 
when relocation was forbidden from freer trade. This raises the question of whether the small nation 
might, under certain parameter conditions, benefit from forbidding relocation while trade costs fall. 
The large nation, as we saw, always experiences a pro-productivity effect of lower trade costs, so International Trade, Offshoring and Heterogeneous Firms, Baldwin & Okubo  18
the welfare impact on the large nation is unambiguously positive (the pro-productivity effect 
reinforces the lower cost of imports).  
Given (1), per-capita welfare in the small nation can be written as: 
    ) * ln( * 1
1
        m E U    
Where  * m  is the weighted average of marginal selling costs in the small market, see (15), which 
covers both imports and locally produced varieties. 
Plainly, all effects will come through  * m , so the axis of investigation will compare the impact of 
freer trade on  * m  in two cases: 1) the instantaneous-entry-then-relocation equilibrium (recall that 
there is no relocation in this case), and 2) the instantaneous-relocation-then-entry case. For 
convenience, we call case 1) the no-relocation case and case 2) the latter the relocation case.  
Since the small-nation domestic cut-off condition, namely aD
1-B* = f, holds in both cases and B* = 
(1-sE)/  * m , we have that  * m  = aD
1-(1-sE)/f. 
 The comparison of  * m ’s in the two cases boils down 
to a comparison of aD’s in the two cases. In particular,  * m  in the no-relocation case exceeds  * m  in 
the relocation case if and only if, aD
1- is higher in the no-relocation case. Given our welfare criteria, 
the no-relocation case is preferred if and only if aD
1- is higher in the no-relocation case. From (9) 
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In both cases, falling trade costs always decrease aD; this enhances the small nation’s welfare as it 
increases m. Intuitively, the result turns on the fact regardless of relocation, trade liberalisation 
promotes competition and pushes out the least efficient firms. As a result, trade liberalisation 
always raises the small nation’s welfare.  
Result 6: Trade liberalisation always promotes small nation’s welfare..  
While trade liberalisation benefits the small nation in both cases, the size of the gain will different. 
By inspection of (26), we see that welfare comparison turns entirely on the issue of whether sn 
exceeds sE when relocation is allowed. Formally, our metric for the welfare effects of relocation can 
be written as: 




















where relocation is welfare improving if this ratio exceeds unity, i.e. if sn > sE when relocation is 
allowed. 
What determines the relative size of sn and sE when relocation is allowed? Section 3 considered two 
extreme cases: instant entry/exit then relocation, and instantaneous relocation then free entry/exit. In 
the instantaneous relocation case, relocation equalised the attractiveness of the two markets at all 
moments, so we assumed that any entry/exit would affect all potential firms equally in the two 
nations. As a consequence, the fall in the world number of varieties was spread on a pro rata basis 
across the two nations – so sn remained equal to sE. Combining this result with (26), we see that if 
relocation is instantaneous, it has no welfare effects. In other words, the small nation’s welfare is 
the same under instantaneous relocation and under forbidden relocation.  
In the general case discussed in Section 3.3, however, neither free entry/exit nor relocation is 
instantaneous. Freer trade will make the large nation more attractive in transition to the long-run 
equilibrium (this is what creates the Home Market Effect pressure). When relocation is allowed but International Trade, Offshoring and Heterogeneous Firms, Baldwin & Okubo  19
occurs slowly, some of the HME pressure will be relived via relocation to the North of firms that 
were create in the South, and some of it will be relived by faster firm creation in the North so that B 
= B* in the long run. We cannot determine what sn/sE will be in the general case, but we can be sure 
that it will exceed its autarky value of unity, so entry will have been faster in the big market. When 
relocation is forbidden, by contrast, we know that aD will be characterised by the second expression 
in (25). Given (26), this tells us that relocation is always welfare improving for the small nation. To 
summarise: 
Result 7: Allowing relocation in the face of trade liberalisation improves the small nation’s 
welfare more when neither free entry/exit nor relocation is instantaneous. 
Both cases of instantaneous relocation and instantaneous entry/exit are perfectly substitutable. 
Relocation and entry/exit eliminates HME and consequently maintains sn = sE. In both case, trade 
liberalisation results in relocation to the North or entry in the North and promotes more imports to 
the South together with lowering import prices in the South. Consequently it raises welfare. On the 
other hand, the general case restores HME. We have two effects. First, slow firm relocation can 
deter relocation and thus the small country can keep more firms than instantaneous case. Second, 
more entry in the North increases imports and trade liberalisation promotes lower import prices. 
These two effects enhance welfare in small country, which is higher than in the two instantaneous 
cases. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Melitz (2003) opened a new line of research in international trade 
by providing tractable models where the entry and exit of firms determines the distribution of 
firm-level efficiency endogenously. One of the most notable results in this heterogeneous-firms 
trade literature concerns the impact of trade integration on productivity; freer trade raises average 
productivity by forcing out the weakest firms and shifting production shares to the most 
productivity firms. These models, however, ignore the possibility that freer trade may alter the 
firm-size distribution via international firm migration, what is called offshoring in North America 
and relocation in Europe. Firms in the standard HFT models are assumed to produce in the nation 
in which they are ‘born.’  
Our paper relaxes this assuming in presenting a model that allows the equilibrium firm-size 
distribution to be influenced by relocation as well as entry and exit. We show that this additional 
channel of adjustment implies that freer trade affects average productivity and the firm-size 
distribution in new ways. In particular, the Home-Market-Effect pressure created by freer trade 
results in the most efficient firms moving from the small nation to the large nation. This in turn 
implies that freer trade has an extra large pro-productivity impact in the large nation. In the small 
nation, the relocation always mitigates the positive productivity effect, and may, in some 
circumstances, result in an anti-productivity effect.  
The paper also shows that relocation is a complex phenomenon in the presence of heterogeneous 
firms and fixed market-entry costs. When trade costs are high, the firm-migration (relocation) 
involves small-nation exporting firms (i.e. firms that sell locally and export both before and after 
moving). When trade costs get low enough, all exporting firms will have already moved to the 
big nation so subsequent relocation involves firms that sell only locally. In this phase, relocation 
reduces the number of varieties available in the small market.  
Regardless of the anti-productivity anti-variety effects of relocation, we show that the small 
nation always benefits by allowing relocation. International Trade, Offshoring and Heterogeneous Firms, Baldwin & Okubo  20
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APPENDIX 
To determine the order of relocation, however, we must consider the relocation process in more 
detail. As we shall see, quadratic adjustment costs smooth out the firm-migration process and 
ensure that the firms with the most to gain are the first to move. The specific formulation of the 
quadratic adjustment costs is: 
(27)   x t    cos  
where x  is the flow of relocating firms and  is the adjustment cost parameter. 
5.1.1  Quadratic adjustment costs and the order of relocation 
Atomistic firms observe the actual level of adjustment costs and move if the gain from doing so 
exceeds the adjustment cost. We observe from (13) and (14) that if the flow of relocation were zero, 
then all Southern firms would wish to move instantaneously (since B-B*>0), but at first, the flow 
and thus the cost would be infinite. Since the gain to the most efficient Southern firms (those with 
a=0) is infinity, only the most efficient Southern firms will relocate at the first instant. Once these 
firms have moved, the flow of relocation would drop from infinite to a finite level, bringing down 
the relocation cost to a high, but finite level. Firms for whom the value of relocating is less than or 
equal this finite level will move next. Given (13) and (14), this implies that the relocation process is 
marked firms moving in order of efficiency, with the most efficient firms moving first.  International Trade, Offshoring and Heterogeneous Firms, Baldwin & Okubo  22
The process continues with both the cost and value of moving approaching zero. Importantly, the 
relocation process makes the big North market more competitive and the Southern market less 
competitive, so the value to any given firm of moving declines as the range of firms that have 
moved expands. This slows the rate of relocation and thereby the level of adjustment costs, so the 
process occurs smoothly. Ultimately, the process stops when the range of relocated firms rises to 
the point where the two markets are equally attractive, i.e. B=B*. The range of firms that relocate in 
response to any given level of trade freeness is [0,aR], where aR (the ‘R’ is a mnemonic for relocate) 
is the threshold level of marginal cost defined by what we call the ‘relocation condition’: 
(28)     * B B   
While relocation is occurring, it is characterised by the equivalence of the benefit and cost of 
changing locations, namely: 
    ] ) ) ' ( * [ ] ' [
  
  D a a n a v   
where a’ is the marginal cost of the current migrants and the right-hand-side terms in brackets 
represent the rate of firm migration (recall that the n* and aD are fixed by the initial conditions 
described above).
17  
As mentioned, relocation alters average competitiveness of each market, so the definition of the B’s 
in the relocation condition, (15), is more complicated than the definition the Section 3.1. 
Specifically for near-zero levels of trade freeness, B=sE/n
wm  where m is now defined to take 
account of the relocation of firms with a’s in the [0,aR] range:  
(29)    













1      
where we have set sn=sE by the initial conditions. The key change here is that now Southern 
varieties with a’s between zero and aR are produced in the North and so are not subject to trade 
costs in the Northern market. B* equals (1-sE)/n
wm *, where the expression for m * is similar to the 
above expression for m . 
The relocation condition B=B* can be solved analytically to get aR as a function of aX: 
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Using the definition of B with m in (15) and aR as defined in  
(17), the export cut-off condition implicitly defines aX as: 





















This condition cannot be solved analytically since  and  are not necessarily integers, but it is clear 
that there is a unique solution since the left-hand side is monotonically falling as aX rises and it 
starts at infinity when aX=0. 
 
                                                 
17 This follows from the fact that when Southern firms with marginal costs below a’ have migrated to the North, the 




o D a a dG n , which solves to
 
D a a n / ) ) ' ( * ( ; taking the time derivative 
yields the result in the text. 